Cross-border trade — 10 things to know on July 6, 2026

1. July 1 was the day USMCA stopped being a 36-year agreement. At the mandatory first joint review — held virtually, no summit photo — USTR Greer's statement ran two sentences of consequence: "The United States did not agree to renew the USMCA in its current form. As a result, the USMCA is not renewed." The automatic 16-year extension to 2042 is off the table. What replaces it: an annual joint review every July 1, with a termination backstop of July 1, 2036 if no consensus ever forms. Mexico and Canada had both filed written support for the full extension; Ebrard has since floated 10-year terms as the fallback. Nothing changes at the border — preferences, rules of origin, dispute panels all still run — but sourcing decisions with a 10-year depreciation schedule now carry an annual political re-underwriting clause.

2. Round 2 closed with a committee, a red line, and a July 20 date. The June 15-17 Washington round produced measurable output: progress on industrial rules of origin, an "economic security" workstream aimed at Chinese content in North American chains, and a new committee reviewing USMCA Chapter 12 sectoral annexes for medical devices, pharma and cosmetics. It also produced the clearest fault line of the whole bilateral: the US seasonal-produce TRQ demand, which Ebrard answered in public — Mexico will not accept seasonal restrictions and would redirect its agricultural purchases elsewhere. Greer's own pre-review framing ("we probably will not resolve all the issues by July 1") aged accurately. Round 3: week of July 20, Mexico City — four days before the §301 action target.

3. Forced-labor §301 comments close today; hearings run July 7-9. USTR's July 2 release locked the schedule: written comments due 11:59 PM EDT tonight (docket USTR-2026-0265), then three days of panels at the ITC starting Tuesday 10 am — on the record, no cameras, transcript to ustr.gov afterward. The proposal itself hasn't moved since June 1-2: 10% for the six economies with at least a partial forced-labor import prohibition (Canada, Ecuador, EU, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan), 12.5% for the other 54 — coverage totaling 59 countries plus the EU, roughly 99.4% of US goods imports. MOFCOM's line held through three pressers: oppose the tariff, keep talking through the Board of Trade. No Chinese countermeasure has been aimed at this track.

4. The 16-economy determination is the loudest thing USTR didn't publish. Since the May 5-8 hearings closed, the excess-capacity docket has gone quiet — no findings, no proposed rates, no Federal Register notice, despite early-June commentary expecting them "in days." The July 24 target hasn't moved, which means USTR now has to land findings, a proposed action, and an implementation order inside three weeks — or let the date slip and open a gap behind the expiring §122. Either path is a scenario CFOs need priced: an accelerated action with minimal comment cycle, or a §122-to-§301 handoff that isn't seamless.

5. §122 has 18 days of statutory life left — and the courts just guaranteed it'll be collected to the end. On June 11 the Federal Circuit converted its administrative stay into a full stay pending appeal in Oregon v. Trump: collection continues, now including the three plaintiffs (Washington State, Burlap & Barrel, Basic Fun) who had won the only injunction. The court's logic — importers suffer no irreparable harm because refunds carry interest — reads as a preview of how long it's willing to let the meter run. No oral argument date is set. The statute does the real work now: 150 days from February 24 lands on July 24, and absent Congressional extension the surcharge dies of old age before any merits opinion. Importers' action item hasn't changed: archive entry data for every §122 dollar paid.

6. The Supreme Court quietly made the 2018 tariffs permanent furniture. Cert denied in HMTX Industries v. United States on June 15. That ends the eight-year, thousands-of-plaintiffs "In re Section 301 Cases" — no refunds on List 3's $200bn or List 4A's $120bn, and appellate blessing for USTR's §307 modification authority. The forward-looking part matters more than the history: §307 is exactly the authority underneath the pending forced-labor and 16-economy actions. The legal risk discount on new §301 tariffs just got smaller.

7. Europe built a double steel wall on July 1 — and both walls charge 50%. Regulation (EU) 2026/1384 replaced the 2018 safeguard: duty-free quota cut 47% to 18.35 million tonnes, over-quota tariff doubled to 50%, and a melt-and-pour declaration requirement (Mill Test Certificates at entry) built to catch third-country transshipment of Chinese-origin steel. The UK moved the same day: quotas down 51%, flat 50% over-quota, 20 product categories. The pincer detail: a cargo squeezed out of the EU quota can no longer arbitrage into the UK — both markets flipped to 50% within 24 hours. For non-FTA exporters, EU+UK steel access is now the tightest it has been since safeguards began in 2018.

8. The same week, the EU-US tariff war formally ended. The Council adopted the Joint Statement regulations June 25; they apply from July 1: EU tariffs on US industrial goods go to zero (about €5bn/year in duty savings for EU importers), with preferential access for US seafood and non-sensitive agriculture, through end-2029. The US side of the bargain: a 15% cap on most EU goods including autos. The contrast is the story — in one week, Brussels doubled the steel wall against global overcapacity and zeroed the tariff wall to Washington. Alignment, not retreat.

9. Beijing's June wave hit 96 entities without touching the §301 file. June 22: MOFCOM Announcement No. 23 put 10 US companies on the export-control list — the first-ever strike at US rare-earth producers (MP Materials, USA Rare Earth), plus drone and defense names — while the Finance Ministry banned government procurement from 46 US defense primes the same morning. June 24: Announcement No. 24 published the working measures under Order 834, a §301-style investigation mechanism with a private-complaint channel and a novel "special fees" instrument. June 29: Announcements No. 27/28 added 20 Japanese defense-linked entities to the control list and parked 20 more on a new watch-list tier. Every action was framed against the Pentagon's 1260H list or Tokyo — none against the forced-labor tariff. The message discipline is the signal: retaliation runs on a separate rail from negotiation.

10. The Board of Trade got real, agriculture got in, and CBAM priced Q2 at €75.28. MOFCOM confirmed on June 25 that both sides have agreed to establish the Board of Trade and are consulting on reciprocal tariff reductions — up to $30bn each way on non-sensitive goods, textiles reportedly excluded; on July 2 agriculture was agreed "in principle" into the framework. USTR's comment docket closes July 10, rebuttals July 27. And this morning Brussels published the Q2 CBAM certificate price: €75.28/tCO2e, eight cents under Q1 — a reminder that in the definitive regime 2026 is a data year, not a payment year (certificates start selling February 1, 2027; first annual declaration September 30, 2027). Busan truce expiry: 127 days. The renewal conversation now has an institution to happen inside.